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6
Why Exit Rights Are the Key 
to the Reduction of Urban-Rural 
Income Disparity in China
Guanzhong James Wen
Trinity College
Since the adoption of the “open up and reform” policy in 1978, 
China has reached many economic milestones. Until recently, it had 
maintained an average growth rate that was not only higher but also 
longer than almost any other nation in modern history (Naughton and 
Tsai 2015).
China is now the second-largest economy and is poised to become 
the largest in a not too distant future. It currently holds the largest for-
eign reserves, producing almost half of the world’s total steel and coal, 
and is the biggest producer of many important industrial products. 
However, China also has been facing some challenges. This chapter 
discusses the following issues: 
• The change in China’s social structure has been lingering much 
more slowly behind that in its economic structure, resulting in 
relatively impoverished farmers and migrant workers, languor-
ous rural communities, and an ineffi  cient farming sector com-
pared with its urban areas.
• Two institutional barriers will result in a middle-income trap 
through exclusive urbanization: the hukou system and the com-
pulsory collective land ownership.
• The reasons it is impossible for China to develop a real land 
market under its Constitutional stipulation.
• The essence of market allocation: price mechanism.
• How to balance between effi  ciency represented by market allo-
cation and control of externalities represented by urban planning 
and zoning. 
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Toward the end of this chapter, I propose how to reform the land 
tenure system in China. 
SOCIAL STRUCTURE, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, 
AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION
As mentioned above, China’s growth rate since 1979 has been 
ranked among the highest for the longest period for almost any nation 
in modern history—a great achievement of China’s open and reform 
policy. However, as shown in the next two sections, its income dis-
parity, particularly its urban/rural income ratio, has become one of the 
worst in East Asia, and perhaps in the world.
The World Bank (1993) defi nes the real economic miracle as growth 
with equity. There is truth in this defi nition. Many countries have 
achieved high growth, but few have achieved good income distribution. 
Among those having achieved relatively equal income distribution, most 
found their economic growth stagnated. Few nations have achieved high 
growth and relatively equal income distribution at the same time. For 
these few, they truly deserve to be crowned as economic miracles. 
To achieve this, it is necessary to keep the sectoral share in the total 
labor force (defi ned here as the social structure) close to its sectoral 
share in total GDP (defi ned here as the economic structure). In other 
words, the social structure should evolve closely and in the same direc-
tion as the economic structure (Wen 2013). 
In China’s context, the share of agriculture in the total labor force 
should follow the trend of a declining share of agriculture in total GDP. 
To achieve this, the rural population must fi nd their way out of the agri-
cultural sector as its share in total GDP falls.
Developed economies have already reached a very low farming 
share in GDP (2–5 percent) and a correspondingly low farming share in 
total population (2–9 percent). It took several hundred years for them to 
achieve both. The other East Asian economies accomplished this much 
faster, in roughly 30–40 years, starting from the early 1960s after a land 
reform to provide farmers an equal footing in land distribution in the 
early 1950s. The rights to free land trading and free rural-urban migrat-
ing enabled Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to not only achieve high 
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growth but also help prevent the worsening of their urban/rural income 
distributions. According to Oshima (1998, Figure 1), the values of the 
Gini coeffi  cient in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan never exceeded 
0.4 during the period 1955–1995. Since then, their social structures 
have been evolving closely to the changes in their economic structure 
because without institutional barriers, farmers could freely trade their 
land and freely migrate to urban areas and to settle down there. 
The Much-Worsened Income Distribution
However, Oshima (1998, Figure 1) shows that, in sharp contrast, 
China started with a relatively low Gini coeffi  cient value of around 0.2 
in the mid-1960s; this value rose signifi cantly above 0.4 by the mid-
1990s. Since then, the income distribution has worsened until recently. 
According to Wildau and Mitchell (2016), the value of the Gini coef-
fi cient in China rose to 0.49 in 2012. 
Han, Zhao, and Zhang (2016) put China’s income distribution 
inequality in a more global perspective. As Figure 6.1 shows, the value 
of China’s Gini coeffi  cient (0.481) was very close to that of the Latin 
American average (0.486), and signifi cantly higher than that of several 
other continents. 
In addition to high values of the Gini coeffi  cient, the urban/rural 
ratio in China is also very high. Based on China’s offi  cial data (Xinhua 
2017), the urban/rural income ratio was 2.72 in 2016.1 Using this ratio, 
one can easily see that the average income of people living in rural 
areas was only about 36.76 percent of the income of those living in 
urban areas. This ratio was once as high as 3.3:1 in 2013; obviously 
this indicator is now looking better.2 However, in terms of income gap, 
the urban-rural income disparity is still worsening—it increased from 
CNY19,758 in 2015 to CNY21,253 in 2016 (Xinhua 2017).
WHY CAN ONLY ENDOGENOUS URBANIZATION BEST 
ACCOMMODATE RURAL POPULATION?
Urbanization provides the best channel of social mobility for the 
vast majority of the rural population in terms of their income and their 
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upward movement along the social ladder. This is attributed to opportu-
nities for greater specialization among these laborers, and to the ability 
to combine with the huge stock of capital and human capital agglomer-
ated in urban areas. 
When urbanization is endogenous—that is, driven by agglomera-
tion eff ect, not simply by the government—then those who migrate to 
urban areas will be able to earn a higher income, and their children 
will have a better education than rural residents in general; otherwise, 
people will not choose to leave their native villages.
Figure 6.2 shows the determination of population size in an endog-
enously urbanizing city. The curve MB represents the marginal benefi t 
of the agglomeration, and the curve MC represents the marginal cost 
of agglomeration, such as congestion, pollution, crime, and legal risks. 
The last one is conspicuously signifi cant because of the insecure prop-
erty rights and seriously distorted land and housing prices. The intersec-
Figure 6.1  International Comparison of Gini Coeffi  cient Values
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tion of the two curves C, or the corresponding point N on the horizontal 
axis, indicates the natural population size of the city. The space on its 
left, where the MB curve is still above the MC curve, implies that the 
net agglomeration is still positive, and the city can generate net gains by 
attracting additional migrants. 
In other words, positive agglomeration eff ect can only be exhausted 
through trial and error by marginal migrants. To try out this population 
boundary of a city, rural residents must have the right to freely relocate 
themselves and to freely trade their land in case they decide to settle 
down in a city. 
THE FIRST TRAP: HUKOU AND LOW SOCIAL MOBILITY
Two institutions stand out as the most important barriers for the 
rural population to legally share urban prosperity and to accumulate 
wealth on equal footing: the hukou system and the land tenure system.3 
China’s hukou system has resulted in urbanization of land much faster 
than the growth of the rural population. 
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The hukou system, represented by line KD, artifi cially limits the 
size of urban population to OK (O refers to the origin of the graph). 
Therefore, population measured by KN is excluded from the ben-
efi t of urbanization. The triangle CDE measures the deadweight loss 
caused by the hukou system. As mentioned above, for income distribu-
tion between urban and rural areas not worsening, the social structure 
should evolve in the same direction as a nation’s economic structure 
and at a similar pace. 
China’s agricultural share in its total GDP has fallen to less than 
10 percent, representing a great achievement for China in its eff ort to 
develop its economy. However, given this rapid drop in its agricultural 
share in GDP, it is more urgent to reduce the share of its rural popula-
tion in its total population. It is not a good sign to see that more than 60 
percent of its total population is still holding rural hukou, and around 48 
percent of its total population is still living in rural areas. 
Migrant workers are forbidden to legally settle in urban areas, 
although they are legally allowed to work there temporarily, and their 
children—some 60 million—are left behind in rural areas. The lack of 
educational opportunities in rural areas dictates that most migrant chil-
dren will have limited human capital and will have low social mobility 
and low incomes in the future. If this situation continues, the prospect 
for China to improve its urban-rural income distribution is severely 
clouded. 
THE GOOD NEWS
The central government is gradually dismantling the hukou system. 
Although big cities will remain closed to most migrant workers, towns 
and small cities are urged to open up to rural migration. Only time will 
tell how eff ective and how soon China can ultimately eliminate the con-
trol over free migration and free settlement. It remains to be seen if 
the rural population in the Western region is allowed to freely settle in 
towns and small cities in China’s prosperous coastal region. If such free 
migration and settlement between regions are allowed, the policy will 
represent a signifi cant breakthrough. 
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THE SECOND TRAP—LAND TENURE SYSTEM
Compared with the hukou system, the land tenure system is an even 
bigger trap for the following reasons:
• It gives local governments either a legal basis or an excuse by 
misinterpreting Article 10 of China’s Constitution to take rural 
land for urban development.
• It prevents the growth of a true land market by prohibiting all 
land trading except by the government. The government under 
this system becomes a monopsony in buying farmers’ land and 
a monopoly in auctioning the leaseholds to developers. The land 
price is seriously distorted, either infl ated or suppressed. 
• The monopolized and seriously distorted land markets have 
almost totally ignored the strong demand of migrant workers for 
aff ordable housing thus far. Aff ordable houses have been sup-
plied by suburban farmers, but they are illegal under the land 
system, frequently facing demolition risk, making the permanent 
settlement of migrant workers impossible.
In the absence of a true land market, the current land system is 
still allocating land through issuing land quotas to provinces and cit-
ies, a practice typically seen under the Central Planning System. How-
ever, these land quotas are not based on equilibrium land prices, hence, 
excess supply and rampant shortage coexist without an automatic cor-
recting mechanism. On one side, ghost towns, idling apartment build-
ings, and deserted industrial parks are emerging everywhere, especially 
in China’s vast inland, but in its coastal areas, housing prices are sky-
rocketing; on the other side, most of the 2.6 hundred million migrant 
workers are living in shelters, slums, ghettos, or urban villages, which 
are being bulldozed by the local governments, aggravating the shortage 
of aff ordable housing.
Clearly the current land tenure system has shifted upward the mar-
ginal cost of living in an urban area by making housing and rental prices 
prohibitively expensive in coastal areas where most migrant workers 
could fi nd jobs. Figure 6.2 shows that when the marginal cost curve 
shifts up, the size of the city population reduces from point N to point 
A, causing another deadweight loss measured by triangle ABC. 
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In summary, the current land tenure system has failed to allo-
cate both rural and urban land effi  ciently, and it has failed to convert 
rural land into urban land effi  ciently and fairly. The last point will be 
explained shortly.
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DEVELOPING A TRUE LAND 
MARKET UNDER THE CURRENT CONSTITUTION 
Article 10 of China’s Constitution makes it impossible to nurture a 
true land market. According to this article, 
land in the cities is owned by the State. Land in the rural and 
suburban areas is owned by collectives except for those portions 
which belong to the State as prescribed by law; house sites and 
privately farmed plots of cropland and hilly land are also owned 
by collectives.
The State may, in the public interest and in accordance with law, 
expropriate or requisition land for its use and make compensation 
for the land expropriated or requisitioned.
No organization or individual may appropriate, buy, sell or other-
wise engage in the transfer of land by unlawful means. The right to 
the use of land may be transferred according to law. All organiza-
tions and individuals using land must ensure its rational use. 
Why is it impossible to develop a real land market under such Con-
stitutional stipulations? First, let’s review the defi nition of what is a 
market economy. According to the MIT Dictionary of Modern Econom-
ics (Pearce 1992, p. 267), “An economic system in which decisions 
about the allocation of resources and production are made on the basis 
of prices generated by voluntary exchanges between producers, con-
sumers, workers and owners of factors of production. Decision mak-
ing in such an economy is decentralized—decisions are made indepen-
dently by groups and individuals in the economy rather than by central 
planners. Market economies usually also involve a system of private 
ownership of the means of production—i.e., they are ‘capitalist’ or ‘free 
enterprise’ economies.”
Here, voluntary exchanges are most crucial to a market economy. 
However, the collective land ownership observed in China is established 
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on an involuntary basis. Rural collectives are not allowed to trade land 
among themselves, let alone the individual farmers. Even if a collective 
is totally ineffi  cient or corrupt, or its leaders are abusive, members are 
not allowed to exit with their share of land to regroup a new collective 
on a truly voluntary basis. This means that collectives in China are com-
pulsory against the market principle of voluntarism.
This system plays the function of permanently trapping those who 
want to leave their native village. They are not allowed to sell their 
land for market compensation. The rental market is underdeveloped 
and insecure because tenancy is not protected and leasing contracts are 
mostly verbal. Some peasants would rather keep their land vacant than 
return land to collectives or rent it out. This means that those who are 
determined to stay in the farming sector cannot steadily expand their 
land scales or signifi cantly increase their incomes because of small-
scale land operation. Because they do not own their land, they cannot 
use it as collateral when seeking fi nancial services. 
Therefore, the land tenure system in its current form is preventing 
the emergence of a real land market and consequently is preventing 
China’s agriculture from being modernized and more effi  cient.
WHY IS EQUILIBRIUM LAND PRICE CRUCIAL?
In the absence of a true land market, land prices are not generated 
by the forces of supply and demand. Therefore,
• We do not know the opportunity cost of each piece of land in 
order to put it to the most valuable (effi  cient) use.
• We do not know how to fairly compensate those whose land is 
taken away by the government.
• We do not know what should be the fair base for property, hous-
ing, and capital gains taxes. Without tax revenues from land 
properties, governments at all localities will continue to be 
addicted to land fi nancing. 
• We do not know how to allocate land of diff erent uses in the correct 
proportions, because such price information can only be generated 
through arbitrage among land of diff erent uses in land markets.
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• We do not know whether the decision on setting 1.8 billion mu 
of arable land as a red line is scientifi cally based. 
• We do not know whether estate-based mortgages are overlever-
aged, leading to housing bubbles and fi nancial crises.
• Urbanization cannot be an endogenous process and cannot sus-
tain because of the distortion in land and housing prices. The 
service sector is doomed to be underdeveloped because of the 
prohibitively high rentals.
• Ghost towns are mushrooming everywhere, when hundreds of 
millions of migrant workers desperately need aff ordable housing 
in the urban areas where they are working and living. Unfortu-
nately, the misallocation of land and housing forces them to live 
in slums, shelters, and urban villages.
FREE EXIT RIGHTS ARE THE KEY
Based on the discussion of the hukou and land systems above, we 
can see that it is urgent and necessary to thoroughly reform the two sys-
tems. In what follows, I want to focus on how to reform the current land 
system. To facilitate discussion, we divide all the land in China into 
three basic zoning categories conceptually in terms of their relationship 
to urbanization: 
 1)  nonurban land—pure farmland and nonfarmland located far 
away from any urban areas, thus unlikely to be urbanized in 
the foreseeable future; 
 2)  urban land—built-up land located in existing urban areas, thus 
fully urbanized; 
 3)  suburban land—the farmland and nonfarmland located close 
to urban centers that is yet to be urbanized. 
To nurture a true land market, the boundaries of all the plots must be 
clearly marked and recorded and their property rights registered before 
they can be traded at market without disputes. As a very encouraging 
development in this direction, local governments in China have been 
certifying land use rights of each farmer by delineating the borders of 
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each plot and its legal users. Obviously, the completion of this task 
is conducive to the establishment of a true open and competitive land 
market. 
All the land, however, is either owned by the state (all the urban 
land) or collectives (almost all the farmland, including the suburban 
land). Individual farmers and urban citizens are not allowed to trade 
land. As we mentioned above, the land market in its current form is 
monopsonistic because the state is the only legal buyer of land, and 
also monopolistic because the state is the only legal supplier of urban 
land, far from being a typical land market that is open to everyone on a 
competitive level. 
To widen participation in a land market to make it open and compet-
itive, it is necessary to allow all plots to be tradable and all the farmers 
to participate as sellers or buyers of land. For this reason, the exit rights 
must be returned to farmers. As mentioned earlier, the current collective 
land ownership was imposed on farmers in the 1950s without neces-
sary consent from farmers. Such imposition was not only a violation of 
voluntarism, a principle allegedly cherished by the Chinese Communist 
Party, but it also led to rampant ineffi  ciency and frequent power abuse. 
In the spirit of voluntarism, farmers should be given the choice to stay 
in their current collectives if they like them, to exit to form new col-
lectives on their own initiatives, or to return to family-based farming, 
which is the prevailing form of farming in the rest of the world. In other 
words, land privatization should be permitted if the party truly respects 
initiatives from farmers themselves. In this sense, certifying and docu-
menting all the plots, pushed by the party and government, are correct 
and necessary steps toward this direction. 
Above I divided all the land into three basic zoning categories. Now 
I briefl y examine how a true land market will aff ect each of them. The 
long-standing mismatches between demand for and supply of land in 
diff erent categories under the current land system will gradually be cor-
rected. First, in urban areas, trading land with diff erent uses will gen-
erate the information required for adjusting zoning by observing the 
relative prices of industrial, residential, commercial, and infrastructural 
land. By gradually easing the restriction on arbitrage among land of 
diff erent uses, effi  ciency in allocating the existing urban land can be 
signifi cantly improved. The excess supply of certain types of land, such 
as land originally designated as industrial, will be corrected by its fall-
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ing price, and the undersupplied land of another type, such as the land 
originally designated as residential, will be corrected by rising price.
Second, by allowing suburban farmland to enter the land market by 
farmers’ own initiative without changing zoning categories, China can 
avoid the possible chaotic situation that resulted from zoning violations. 
At the same time, local governments are not allowed to requisition sub-
urban land unless for the pursuit of public interest. This will immedi-
ately lead to the short supply of urban land and increased land prices 
where urban areas are growing. The increasing price sends a signal to 
zoning authorities to speed up converting suburban farmland into urban 
land. The suburban land market is crucially important because it con-
nects urban and rural areas, unifying the whole nation’s land market, and 
also helps determine the natural border between rural and urban areas. 
Third, more effi  cient farmers now can expand the operation scale 
of their farms through acquiring land at land market, and larger and 
modern farms will emerge from such transactions. Those who want to 
permanently migrate to urban areas will get compensated when they 
sell their land. 
As stated earlier, to avoid disorder in land and housing markets, nei-
ther sellers nor buyers of any type of land should be allowed to change 
the current zoning categories of their land for the time being unless they 
fi rst obtain approvals from the government. Under this condition, free 
land trade will not trigger a collapse of the land and housing markets. 
The fear of a possible collapse of land and housing markets is a main 
source of government hesitation in land system reform, a serious con-
cern often cited by those who are opposed to the market-oriented land 
reform as a main argument. To remove government’s fear, the current 
zoning categories should be kept for a certain period. The planning and 
zoning offi  ce should gradually adjust zoning categories by designating 
more land in suburban areas as urban land if the land price there is ris-
ing, and designating less land as urban land in urban areas where the 
land price is declining. 
To reduce manipulation and interference in the land market, the 
government should stop acquisitioning land from local farmers for 
nonpublic purposes, as Article 10 of China’s Constitution stipulates. 
This means that the role of planning and zoning in China should be 
fundamentally reformed; its rise in market economies was, and is still, 
a necessary response to the increasing need to address market failure, 
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represented by negative externalities and lack of public space due to 
urbanization (Wen 2014). However, in China, diff erent from playing a 
complementary role in market allocation, as is seen in developed mar-
ket economies, planning and zoning are a main remnant of its disman-
tled Central Planning System, and the government has been directly 
allocating land by arbitrarily determining land zoning and prohibiting 
non-state-owned land to enter land market with equal rights. It is worth 
noting that China’s urban planning and zoning are selectively regulat-
ing market failures, depending on the type of land ownership, as the 
case of the urban village shows. 
After establishing a true land market, the main target of planning 
and zoning should focus on fi ltering negative externalities and securing 
land of public use, not on fi ltering out the non-state-owned land. The 
thorny issue of urban villages and housing with few property rights will 
be resolved accordingly. Since they are either surrounded by or adja-
cent to urban areas, they should be part of urban land. Therefore, the 
local government has the same responsibilities to provide better plan-
ning and zoning regulation to all the urban villages and housing with 
few property rights, and better infrastructures such as sanitation, clean 
water, public toilets, schools, and clinics. In return, the owners in urban 
villages and owners of housing with few property rights have full obli-
gation to pay all kinds of property taxes and capital gains taxes. If this 
proposal is accepted and enforced, the issue of urban village and hous-
ing with few property rights will be an issue of enforcing planning and 
zoning instead of an issue of discriminating against nonstate ownership. 
Finally, the government should stop relying on land fi nancing and 
instead levy property, housing, and capital gains taxes, in addition to 
issuing local public bonds to fi nance local infrastructure, using future 
land taxes to pay off . Land taxes are recurrent compared with one-time 
land fi nancing. The latter will dry up sooner or later when urbanization 
nears an end.
CHINA IS AT A CROSSROADS
China’s urban-rural income disparity is among the worst in the 
world. Historical experiences from developed nations and from China’s 
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East Asian neighbors eloquently demonstrate that to reduce this dispar-
ity, China must rapidly reduce its rural population. Only when a nation’s 
social structure matches its economic structure can it achieve the goal 
of narrowing its urban/rural income gap. However, not only does 48 
percent of China’s total population live in rural areas while its agricul-
ture’s share in total GDP is less than 10 percent, but also 2.6 hundred 
million migrant workers remain unsettled in urban areas because of the 
hukou system, and because of the prohibitively high housing prices as 
a result of the current land tenure system. 
As Figure 6.2 shows, the hukou and land systems are causing two 
types of deadweight loss—if they can be eliminated, then China can 
easily accommodate hundreds of millions of migrant workers and their 
families in urban areas. To make its urbanization more effi  cient and 
inclusive, China should focus on urbanizing its rural population rather 
than its rural land. If China decides to nationalize all the urban land, as 
advocated by some, then it will lose its last chance to develop a land 
market. If China is serious about nurturing a true competitive land mar-
ket, it needs to give farmers the exit rights from compulsory collective 
land ownership and legalize land trading as long as the land use is not 
changed by users themselves. 
China should also unify its land market nationwide. To avoid per-
manently fragmenting its rural land market, it should not consolidate 
the exclusively community-based collective land ownership. China 
should also abolish its hukou system as soon as possible. Only when it 
implements these two reforms can the country accelerate the absorption 
of rural surplus labor. Such an endogenous urbanization will soon sig-
nifi cantly improve its urban-rural income disparity, as the experiences 
from China’s East Asian neighbors have demonstrated.
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Notes
  1. According to this offi  cial news agency, “Urban and rural per capita disposable 
income reached 33,616 yuan and 12,363 yuan in 2016, up 5.6 percent and 6.2 
percent in real terms, respectively, according to the National Bureau of Statistics.” 
Based on these two numbers, we can calculate the urban-rural income ratio (See 
Xinhua 2017).
  2. According to the 2013 data released from the China State Statistical Bureau, in 
2012 China’s urban-rural income ratio reached its highest since 1978. In 2012, 
urban average income was 17,175 yuan, while it was 5,153 yuan in rural areas, 
and the urban-rural income ratio was 3.33:1, compared to 3.32:1 and 3.31:1 in 
2007 and 2008, respectively. If we include the hidden benefi ts received by resi-
dents with formal urban hukou, this ratio could rise to 6:1. See http://wenda
.so.com/q/1363044987065138 (in Chinese; accessed June 21, 2017). 
 3. In 1958, the Chinese government offi  cially promulgated the family register sys-
tem to control the movement of people between urban and rural areas. Individuals 
were broadly categorized as a rural or urban worker. A worker seeking to move 
from the country to urban areas to take up nonagricultural work would have to 
apply through the relevant bureaucracies. The number of workers allowed to make 
such moves was tightly controlled. Migrant workers would require six passes to 
work in provinces other than their own. People who worked outside their autho-
rized domain or geographical area would not qualify for grain rations, employer-
provided housing, or health care. 
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